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Do Schools Matter for High Math Achievement? 
Evidence from the American Mathematics Competitions†
By Glenn Ellison and Ashley Swanson*
This paper uses data from the American Mathematics Competitions 
to examine the rates at which different high schools produce  high-
achieving math students. There are large differences in the frequency 
with which students from seemingly similar schools reach high 
achievement levels. The distribution of unexplained school effects 
includes a thick tail of schools that produce many more  high-achieving 
students than is typical. Several additional analyses suggest that the 
differences are not primarily due to unobserved differences in student 
characteristics. The differences are persistent across time, suggesting 
that differences in the effectiveness of educational programs are not 
primarily due to direct peer effects. (JEL H75, I21, I24, I28, R23)
 High-achieving students make important contributions to scientific and technical 
fields, and educational productivity has been heralded as a vital source of com-
parative advantage for the United States.1 It is therefore troubling that the United 
States trails most OECD countries not only in average math performance, but also 
in the fraction of students who earn very high math scores.2 It is yet unclear how 
1 Two notable examples of  high-achieving high school students with a large economic impact are Microsoft’s 
Bill Gates, who coauthored a computer science paper as a Harvard freshman, and Google’s Sergey Brin, who 
finished in the top 55 on the 1992 Putnam Exam. See Hoxby (2003) for a discussion of education as a source of 
US comparative advantage in  human-capital intensive industries; Krueger and Lindahl (2001) and Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2008) for surveys of the empirical literature on education and growth; and Altonji (1995), Levine and 
Zimmerman (1995), Rose and Betts (2004), Joensen and Nielsen (2009), and Altonji, Blom, and Meghir (2012) for 
evidence on math and the labor market. 
2 Hanushek, Peterson, and Woessmann (2011) note that “most of the world’s industrialized nations” have a 
higher percentage of students reaching advanced levels on the 2006 PISA (Programme for International Student 
Assessment) test than does the United States. On the 2009 PISA math test, just 1.9 percent of US students achieved 
“Level 6” scores, whereas the OECD average was 3.1 percent and Singapore had 15.6 percent of its students at 
this level. PISA’s reading tests indicate that the United States is good at producing students with very high verbal 
achievement: the US’s percentage of “Level 6” reading students is well above the OECD average (1.5 percent 
versus 0.8 percent). 
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best the United States might address this significant shortcoming. It seems obvious 
that  high-quality schools would play an important role, but several recent papers 
that examine gifted programs and elite magnet schools have found further troubling 
evidence that these schools/programs do not appear to benefit marginal students.3 
In this paper, we examine the questions of whether schools matter for high math 
achievement and whether there are many more students in the United States who 
would have reached high math achievement levels in a different environment. We 
examine the rates at which different schools produce high-scorers in the American 
Mathematics Competitions (AMC) contests and note that there are substantial dif-
ferences across seemingly similar schools. We conduct several additional analyses 
to investigate whether these differences may be due to unobserved differences in 
underlying student ability. The analysis suggests that there are substantial differences 
in the effectiveness of schools’ educational programs and that the  high-achieving 
students we observe are a small subset of those who would have reached high math 
achievement levels in a different environment.
Section I describes the primary data source for our study, the Mathematical 
Association of America’s AMC 12 contest. The contest is a  25-question multiple 
choice test on precalculus topics given annually to over 100,000 US students at 
about 3,000 high schools. The primary advantages of the AMC are that the test 
is explicitly designed to test depth of knowledge and  high-level  problem-solving 
skills and can distinguish among students at very high achievement levels. The pri-
mary drawback, which will influence how we conduct the analysis, is that the test 
is taken by a  nonrandom  self-selected sample of students. We examine different 
levels of “high” achievement. Many of our analyses focus on counts of students 
within a school who score at least 100 on the 2007 AMC 12. One can think of this 
as roughly comparable in difficulty to scoring 800 on the math SAT, but measured 
using a more reliable test that emphasizes greater depth of knowledge.4 We also 
examine students at a substantially higher achievement level: those scoring at least 
120 on the AMC 12, which puts them well above the 99.9th percentile in the US 
population.5 We match AMC schools to data from the census, National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES), college board, and ACT to obtain demographic data 
and other covariates and conduct most of our analyses on the subsample of pub-
lic, coed,  nonmagnet,  noncharter US high schools that administer the AMC 12 and 
could be matched to the other databases. Section II discusses the data in more detail.
Section III begins with our most basic observation: some schools produce many 
more AMC high-scorers than do other schools with similar demographics. Negative 
binomial regressions show that there are a number of strong demographic predic-
tors of high achievement. For example, a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction 
of adults with graduate degrees is associated with a seven percent increase in the 
number of AMC high-scorers, and a one percentage point increase in the fraction 
of the population that is  Asian American is associated with a two percent increase. 
3 See Abdulkadirog˘lu, Angrist, and Pathak (2014); Bui, Craig, and Imberman (2014); and Dobbie and Fryer 
(2014). 
4 The highest possible score on the math SAT is 800 and is achieved by approximately one percent of  SAT 
test-takers. 
5 One noteworthy student who reached this level five years earlier is Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, whose name 
appears on the AMC’s 2002 distinguished honor roll for having scored 121.5. 
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But the most important finding is that the demographic effects are far from sufficient 
to account for the observed differences in the rates at which different schools are 
producing  high-achieving students. The excess variance parameter in the negative 
binomial model can be thought of as an estimate of the magnitude of the unobserved 
multiplicative “school effects” that would be necessary to account for the observed 
dispersion. We find that the necessary variance is 0.73 at the  100-AMC level and 
2.18 at the  120-AMC level: e.g., it is as if a school that is one standard deviation 
above average produces students who score at least 100 on the AMC 12 at a rate that 
is 85 percent ( ≈  √ _ 0.73 ) greater than average.
Section IV examines the distribution of the unobserved “school effects.” The 
motivation for examining these distributions, rather than being satisfied with know-
ing the variance, is similar to that for the literature on the heterogeneity in teacher 
 value-added: it is useful to know, for example, if the variance seems to be due to 
the existence of a subset of  low-performing schools in which students are very 
unlikely to become AMC high-scorers, or if it is due to a small (or big) set of schools 
that produce  high-scorers at much (or slightly) higher than average rate.6 Counts 
of  high-achieving students are inherently small, so one cannot precisely estimate 
a school fixed effect for any one school. But one can estimate the distribution of 
school effects across schools.7 Formally, we implement a nonparametric estimator 
for the distribution of the unobserved component in a model in which schools pro-
duce high-scorers at Poisson rates which differ due to observed school and local 
area characteristics and an unobserved component.8 We estimate that many schools 
are producing high-scorers at a well below average rate, e.g., 32 percent of schools 
appear to be producing high-scorers at less than  one-half of the average rate. And 
a striking finding is that there appears to be thick upper tail of schools that produce 
AMC high-scorers at many times the average rate. For example, we estimate that 
more than 11 percent of schools are producing AMC high-scorers at more than twice 
the rate one would expect given their demographics and 1 percent of schools are 
producing AMC high-scorers at more than five times the average rate.
The “school effects” we estimate can be thought of as indexes that conflate mul-
tiple factors that lead to heterogeneity in outcomes. They will reflect differences in 
causal effects across school environments. But they will also reflect other less inter-
esting sources of outcome heterogeneity: differences due to potentially observable 
demographic differences not captured by variables in our dataset; unobservable dif-
ferences in student ability due to location decisions of parents of gifted children; and 
even less interestingly, differences in the fraction of the  high-achieving math stu-
dents at each school who take the AMC 12 test. Section V presents several additional 
analyses aimed at assessing whether effects of the less interesting types are likely 
to account for a substantial portion of the heterogeneity we have found. To examine 
6 See, for example, Gordon, Kane, and Staiger (2006) for plots of the estimated distribution of teacher qualities 
obtained by shrinking estimated teacher fixed effects to take out purely random variation. 
7 Although we have AMC data at the individual level, we only observe some coarse demographic variables 
and hence have chosen to estimate school effects rather than, for example, multilevel models as in Skrondal and 
 Rabe-Hesketh (2009). 
8 The method involves a series expansion similar to that of Gurmu, Rilstone, and Stern (1999) but relying on a 
different characterization of the likelihoods designed to be more appropriate for potentially  fat-tailed distributions. 
Appendix I contains more detail on the estimation along with Monte Carlo estimates illustrating the performance 
of the estimator. 
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the effects of heterogeneity in participation rates, we compare the  magnitudes at 
the AMC 100 and AMC 120 levels. (We argue that selection into  test-taking is not 
important at the higher level.) We explore the importance of unobserved heteroge-
neity in student populations in two ways: we examine counts of students achieving 
perfect scores on the math sections of the SAT and ACT which should be similarly 
affected by demographic differences but less sensitive to differences in the depth of 
knowledge developed by the school environment; and we compare school effects 
estimated from counts of all  high-scoring students with school effects estimated 
from counts of  high-scoring girls. A motivation here is that unobserved demo-
graphic differences that impact location decisions should not differ much between 
 high-ability male and female students, whereas differences in school environments, 
such as whether a school’s  high-level math programs are  female-friendly, would 
lead to  gender-related differences.9 Taken together, these analyses provide evidence 
that unobserved heterogeneity in performance across schools is much greater than 
can be explained by student heterogeneity or selection into taking the test.
Section VI presents several analyses intended to provide insight into the mech-
anisms that may be making some schools more effective than others. We begin by 
exploring one very simple mechanism: there could be large effects on the number 
of students with  upper-tail scores if some schools increase their students’ scores 
by a constant and the distribution of scores has a  thin-tailed distribution. We look 
for such a mechanism by including  school-average SAT/ACT scores as a covari-
ate. We find little effect, suggesting that our school effects reflect something salient 
for  high-achieving students in particular. Although we have discussed our school 
effects as indexes reflecting heterogeneity in outcomes, it is more accurate to think 
of them as measures of the strength of the forces needed to produce the observed 
degree of clustering of  high-scoring students. Such clustering could be generated by 
unobserved heterogeneity in school quality, but it could also be an artifact of strong 
peer effects among  high-scoring students. Using a formal model similar in spirit to 
that of Ellison and Glaeser (1997), we note that, with a single observation on each 
school, one cannot distinguish unobserved heterogeneity in school quality from peer 
effects as a source of such clustering. However, one can estimate the relative impor-
tance of school quality versus peer effects with multiple observations per school if 
school quality is persistent and peer effects are not felt across periods. We present 
such an estimate derived from comparing the agglomeration of 2007 high-scorers 
to the coagglomeration of 2007 and 2003 high-scorers. It suggests that differences 
in school environments are not primarily due to  within-cohort peer effects. Finally, 
we present some qualitative observations on some of the most unexpectedly suc-
cessful schools. Among our observations are that a number of these schools have a 
 long-serving “star” teacher.
Our work is related to a number of literatures. One is the literature on the effective-
ness of elite schools and gifted programs. Recent papers by Abdulkadirog˘lu, Angrist, 
and Pathak (2014); Dobbie and Fryer (2014); and Bui, Craig, and Imberman (2014) 
examine the effects of elite magnet schools and gifted programs on  high-ability 
students using regression discontinuity designs. Their common finding that the 
9 Ellison and Swanson (2010) document that, at the highest performance levels, female  high-scorers are drawn 
from a much smaller set of  super-elite schools than are male  high-scorers. 
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 programs have no impact on the test scores of marginal admitted students is striking 
given that one might have expected the students to benefit from superior peers even 
absent superior instruction and has attracted a great deal of attention. Our contrast-
ing suggestion that schools are important for gifted students could potentially be 
reconciled in various ways: the tests we study assess more  in-depth understanding 
and  problem-solving skills; effects of programs on marginal admitted students could 
be very different from the effects on students in the opposite tail; or it could be that 
the particular gifted programs studied in the previous papers are not very effective 
but the programs of many other schools in our sample are.10
A second related literature on gifted students is that on  low-income students with 
high SAT/ACT scores missing from the student bodies of elite colleges. Several 
authors have noted that there are many such students and a proximate cause is that 
many low-income high school students with high SAT/ACT scores do not apply to 
elite colleges.11 Hoxby and Avery (2013) provide the most comprehensive analysis 
and document that such students are disproportionately found in areas where they 
are unlikely to have the opportunity to attend a selective high school, to study with 
teachers who attended selective colleges, and to interact with many  high-achieving 
peers. Our findings are somewhat analogous in that we are suggesting that there 
are many students who could have achieved an educational distinction in a dif-
ferent environment. One difference, however, is that (by focusing on schools that 
offer the AMC) we are focusing on missing students from within a set of relatively 
 high-achieving high schools. Presumably, the set of students identified in the papers 
noted above would be a substantial additional source of students who could have 
been high math achievers.12
There is a much larger literature on quality differences across schools affect-
ing average achievement. This includes many papers examining how inputs affect 
achievement and papers that focus on differences in productivity related to compe-
tition, vouchers, charter schools, etc.13 Many of these papers control for selection 
effects and estimate causal effects relevant to school reform debates. The smaller 
literature examining residual variance is more closely related.14 These papers gen-
erally find that unobserved  school-level heterogeneity is much less important than 
are student and neighborhood characteristics for predicting test scores, graduation 
rates, and labor market outcomes. Our findings that schools appear to matter a great 
deal to  high-achieving students may sound conflicting, but could be reconciled in 
several ways: it has been noted previously that differences that are small relative to 
 within-school variation and/or demographic differences can still be large in abso-
lute terms; environmental differences that produce small differences in mean scores 
10 Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) examine additional test scores of admitted students and argue that Boston Latin 
School also appears to have little impact on the performance of students farther from the cutoff on state proficiency 
tests. 
11 See Bowen, Kurzweil, and Tobin (2005); Avery et al. (2006); and Pallais and Turner (2006). 
12 Two other relevant literatures on  high-achieving students are the literature on  cross-sectional differences in 
high achievement (e.g., Hanushek, Peterson, and Woessman 2011; Pope and Sydnor 2010; and Andreescu et al. 
2008), and the literature on how  proficiency-focused reforms may harm  high-achieving students (e.g., Krieg 2008; 
Neal and Schanzenbach 2010; and Dee and Jacob 2011.) 
13 See Coleman (1966); Hanushek (1986); Card and Krueger (1992); Hoxby (2000, 2003); Angrist et al. (2002); 
Hoxby, Murarka, and Kang (2009); Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2011); and Dobbie and Fryer (2011). 
14 See Jencks and Brown (1975); Solon, Page, and Duncan (2000); Rothstein (2005); and Altonji and Mansfield 
(2010). 
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could have a magnified impact when one looks at tail outcomes; or there could be 
more true heterogeneity in school quality relevant to high math achievement.
Our methodology is related to the literature on measuring agglomeration, includ-
ing papers such as Ellison and Glaeser (1997); Marcon and Puech (2003); Duranton 
and Overman (2005); Bayer and Timmins (2007); and Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr 
(2010). Whereas many indexes are motivated as a scalar representation of the 
strength of agglomerative forces, we quantify agglomerative forces by estimating 
a distribution of effect sizes. Our discussion of peer effects and unobserved hetero-
geneity is also related to Graham (2008), which derives general conditions under 
which peer effects and unobserved heterogeneity can be separately identified by 
looking at residual covariances and includes an application to peer effects in the 
STAR experiment.
I. The American Mathematics Competitions
The American Mathematics Competitions is the largest and most prestigious 
series of math competitions for US high school students. The AMC 12 contest is a 
25-question multiple choice test administered in over 3,000 US high schools. About 
100,000 students participated in 2007.15 Our primary motivation for examining 
AMC data is that we feel that the AMC 12 is superior to any other test administered 
at comparable scale in its reliability and validity for identifying students at very high 
levels of math achievement.
Regarding reliability, the most natural comparison is to the math portion of the 
SAT reasoning test. We regard the SAT as not reliable above the ninety-seventh per-
centile: when students who score an 800 (a perfect score which is the ninety-ninth 
percentile) retake the math SAT, only 15 percent score 800 again and their average 
retake score of 752 is a ninety-seventh percentile score. Scoring 100 on the AMC 12 
can be thought of as roughly comparable in difficulty to scoring 800 on the SAT. 
Scoring 120 on the AMC 12 can be thought of as at least an order of magnitude more 
difficult and places students above the 99.9th percentile of the SAT population. In a 
striking contrast to the SAT, the AMC 12 remains well calibrated even at the higher 
of these levels.16
Regarding validity, we would argue first that a casual inspection of the tests 
strongly suggests that the AMC 12 is superior to the SAT as a test of important math 
skills. A student is awarded an 800 score on the math SAT only if he or she can 
work through 54 relatively straightforward problems in 70 minutes without making 
a single mistake. The AMC 12 consists of 25 problems on a wide range of precalcu-
lus topics. They generally require greater depth of knowledge and problem solving 
skills than SAT questions. To score 100 on the AMC 12, a student need only solve 14 
of the 25 problems in 75 minutes. To give a sense of what this entails, Figure 3 in the 
15 The AMC 12 is the first stage of a series. In 2007, about 8,000 AMC 12 high-scorers were invited to take the 
American Invitational Mathematics Examination (AIME). About 500 AMC/AIME high-scorers were then invited 
to take the USAMO. Finally, about 50 high-scorers from the USAMO were invited to a summer training program, 
from which 6 students were chosen to form the US team for the International Mathematical Olympiad. 
16 The AMC 12 is offered on two different dates each year. As noted in Ellison and Swanson (2010), students 
who scored 95 to 105 on the first 2007 date and retook the test averaged 103 with a standard deviation of 11 on the 
retake. Students who scored 115 to 125 on the first date averaged 119 with a standard deviation of 10 on the retake. 
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Appendix contains questions 13 through 20 from the 2007 AMC 12. Questions are 
arranged in increasing difficulty, so students will probably need to solve at least two 
or three of these problems to score 100. Scoring 120 on the AMC 12 is much harder. 
It requires answering at least 19 questions correctly. Hence, it requires that students 
be able to work much more quickly and solve essentially all of the questions shown 
in the figure.
Statistical evidence of validity can also be provided by examining how high 
AMC scorers do when taking other tests. To develop evidence on how well AMC 
scores predict success on  SAT-style tests, we obtained AMC and SAT scores for 
195  quasi-randomly selected MIT applicants. Table 1 reports the mean score and 
the fraction of 800s that students obtained when they first took the math SAT as a 
function of their 2007 (eleventh grade) AMC 12 score.17 The table provides striking 
evidence that the AMC 12 is much more powerful predictor of students’ ability to 
achieve a high SAT score than is the SAT itself. To develop evidence on how well 
AMC scores predict success in a very different important environment—solving 
more difficult  open-ended problems—we gathered data from two states, Georgia 
and Massachusetts, which have  state-level competition series that start with a 
broadly administered multiple choice test and culminate with tests that ask students 
to solve more  open-ended problems and write some formal proofs.18 Georgia’s 
2007 contest started with 1,440 students from 88 schools. At the end, 3 students 
were named as winners and 27 were awarded honorable mention. Despite these 
very long odds and the proof orientation of the final test, 15 of the 20 students at 
participating schools who had scored at least 120 on the 2007 AMC 12 made the top 
30.19 The 2007 Massachusetts contest started with 2,000+ students from roughly 
60 schools and 20 students were named as winners. Students scoring at least 120 on 
the 2007 AMC 12 could not possibly have succeeded at a comparable rate on the 
Massachusetts contest; there were 47 such students at participating schools. But the 
slightly more select sample of 22 students who had scored at least 129 on the AMC 
12 were again remarkably successful given the long odds and very strong field: 12 
of the 22 finished in the top 20. We conclude that the AMC 12 does remarkably well 
in identifying students with  high-level math skills.
The primary drawbacks of the AMC 12 as a research tool are that it is only admin-
istered in a nonrandom subset of US high schools and that students  self-select into 
participation. The 3,000  AMC-offering schools are only about 10 percent of the 
total number of US high schools. The fraction of  high-achieving US high school 
students who can take the AMC 12 in their high school is much higher than 10 per-
cent—schools’ decisions to offer the AMC 12 are highly correlated with student 
demographics—but still probably only about 50 percent.20 The lack of univer-
sal administration makes it impossible for us to provide estimates of the number 
of  high-achieving math students nationwide. However, we can work around this 
17 The final column contains data from the College Board on how students with an 800 SAT perform when they 
retake it. 
18 See Figure 4 in the Appendix for two sample problems from Georgia’s 2007 contest. 
19 Each of the three winners scored at least 132 on the AMC 12. 
20 One statistic we can provide to support this is that 58 percent of the students who were named Presidential 
Scholar candidates (an honor based on having high combined math plus reading SAT or ACT scores) attended a 
high school that offered the AMC 12. 
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 drawback by focusing our analyses on heterogeneity in achievement within the set 
nonmagnet, noncharter, coeducational public schools that administer the AMC 12.
The second drawback of the AMC is more problematic: some schools may be 
more aggressive than others in encouraging their best math students to take the 
AMC 12. This will be a source of apparent performance differences even when edu-
cational environments are identical. The main thing we will do to try to get a sense 
for how this may be affecting our results is to perform some analyses both on the 
set of students scoring 100 on the AMC 12 and on the set of students scoring 120 
on the AMC 12.
II. Data
The 2007 AMC 12 contest consisted of two separate tests administered on dif-
ferent dates: schools could give the 12A exam on February 6, 2007 and/or the 12B 
exam on February 21, 2007.21 Our raw data are at the individual level and contain 
the test date (A or B), score, student ID, school ID, grade, gender, and home zip 
code. For most of our analyses we work with  school-level aggregates. We merge the 
AMC data with several other databases. First, we match the schools to the schools 
in the NCES Common Core of Data (CCD) and Private School Survey (PSS) by 
school name, city, and state.22 Second, we obtain additional demographic vari-
ables by matching the schools to census data on the zip code in which the school is 
located.23 Finally, we matched the schools to a database containing counts of SAT/
ACT takers, average SAT/ACT scores, and counts of students with perfect scores 
by school.24
21 The primary motivation for having two test dates is to facilitate the participation of schools that may be on 
vacation or have some other conflict with one date. About 64 percent of US schools administer only the 12A exam, 
with 28 percent administering only the 12B, and 8 percent administering both. 
22 The AMC school IDs are usually a school’s CEEB (College Entrance Examination Board) code. We 
obtain the school name, city, and state using the CEEB search program on the College Board’s website. Of the 
3,730 schools with numerical CEEB codes in the AMC data, 3,105 were matched to schools in the NCES data. 
Three hundred eleven of the unmatched 625 schools do not appear in the NCES data because they are not in the 
United States. A further 160 could not be matched because the AMC school IDs were not valid CEEB codes. The 
remaining 154 unmatched schools will include among others, private schools that do not appear in the NCES survey 
data because private schools are not required to fill out the PSS. Among the matched schools, a further three were 
dropped because they were missing covariates used in the estimations described below. 
23 Such data were available for 3,021 of 3,105 AMC schools. 
24 We drop schools from the sample if we are unable to match to the SAT data. We also drop if the ACT data 
are missing and the school is located in a state where more than 20 percent of students take the ACT, or if the SAT 
data are missing and the school is located in a state where more than 20 percent of students take the SAT. We drop 
all data from Arkansas, Illinois, and Wyoming, where all ACT data are missing. A total of 157 schools are dropped 
for one of these reasons. 
Table 1—SAT Math Scores for a Sample of Students with AMC 12 Scores in Various Ranges
AMC 12 scores
Prior
800 SAT80s 90s 100s 110s 120s 130s 140s
Mean on first math SAT 711 745 773 774 791 793 800 752
Percent with 800 on first SAT 0 19 35 38 65 60 100 15
Sample size 12 32 83 21 32 10 5 —
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Our primary variables of interest will be counts of students in each school scoring 
at least 100 or 120 on the AMC 12.25 In defining these variables we use the count of 
students scoring at least the cutoff on the 12A contest if the school administered the 
12A and the count scoring at least the cutoff on the 12B exam if the school offered 
only the 12B.26 In our analyses using SAT/ACT data we use both  school-average 
scores and the number of students with perfect scores. In defining these variables, 
we use a student’s SAT score if the student took the SAT and the ACT score if the 
student did not.27
Most of our analyses will be run on the set of public, coed, nonmagnet, nonchar-
ter schools that administered the AMC 12. Eliminating magnet schools is import-
ant to make it feasible to control for the quality of the student population using 
available demographic data on the school and its zip code. In addition to drop-
ping 800 schools listed by the NCES as being private,  noncoed, magnet, or charter 
schools, and 3 schools missing NCES data on school demographics, we dropped 
an additional 76 schools after a manual examination: we examined all schools that 
were among the 200 largest positive outliers in preliminary regressions of the count 
of AMC and SAT high-scorers on demographic variables, as well as schools outside 
the first to ninety-ninth percentile range in percent of female students, and dropped 
schools that offered a special program that seemed likely to attract  high-achieving 
math/science students from outside a neighborhood attendance area.
Note that in aggressively dropping schools with  magnet-like features, we are 
omitting many schools with programs explicitly designed to promote high math 
achievement. Hence, while our inability to eliminate all  self-selection is a factor 
that will lead us to overstate the prevalence of  high-achieving schools, our data 
construction also has a potentially strong bias working in the opposite direction. For 
example, we drop Rockdale County HS in Conyers, GA from our dataset because 
it houses a  school-within-a-school, the Rockdale Magnet School for Science and 
Technology, which enrolled about 40 students per grade in 2007. However, even 
if one were to think of these students as the 40 best in the entirety of Rockdale 
County, the school’s performance would be impressive. The entire county’s popu-
lation is only about 85,000 and given its demographics (e.g., majority free/reduced 
lunch, 60 percent African American, 2 percent Asian American), the three AMC 
12 high-scorers from the school in 2007 are about ten times as many as one would 
have expected to find in the entire county. And the fact that the school has special 
25 The AMC 12A and 12B are not necessarily identical in difficulty. To control for this, we adjust the AMC 12B 
cutoffs such that, within the sample of 2,286 students who took both exams, the count of students scoring above 
100 on the 12A is equivalent to the count of students scoring above the adjusted cutoff on the 12B. We perform a 
similar adjustment for the 120 cutoff. Based on this adjustment, we use 12B cutoffs of 108 and 123 as equivalent 
to 100 and 120 on the 12A. 
26 Note that we do not count students from a school that offered both the 12A and the 12B if they did not partic-
ipate in the 12A and then scored above the cutoff on the 12B. We count in this way to be conservative in measuring 
heterogeneity: schools that administer the AMC 12 on both dates are disproportionately  high-achieving schools 
and we want to eliminate any advantage they may obtain from increasing participation by offering both test dates. 
27 We convert ACT scores to SAT equivalents using SAT/ACT concordance data from Lavergne and Walker 
(2001), which relied on 1999–2000 data, and Dorans (1999), which relied on  1994–1996 data. Each source 
specifies a range of SAT scores corresponding to each ACT score. We construct an implied SAT equivalent for 
each source using their tables directly, and take the average of the implied scores across sources to generate our 
SAT/ACT correspondence. Results are not sensitive to the methodology. One additional school is dropped because 
the  school-average ACT score in the SAT/ACT database is equal to four. 
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programs makes it all the more plausible that features of the school environment are 
responsible for this success.
Table 2 contains summary statistics for the merged database of 1,984 sam-
ple schools offering the AMC. The average school has 0.8 students score at least 
100 on the AMC 12 and 0.11 students score at least 120.28 The number of female 
 high-scorers is substantially lower. Relative to the average public,  noncharter, 
 nonmagnet, coed high school in the United States, the average school offering the 
AMC is larger, has more  Asian American and fewer black and Hispanic students, 
is less likely to receive Title I funding, and has fewer students qualifying for the 
free lunch program. Sample AMC schools are also located in wealthier, more urban 
zip codes with more  highly educated adults. As expected given school and region 
demographics, AMC schools also perform better than the average US public school 
on the SAT math, having higher mean scores and more students with perfect scores.
III. Differences in High Math Achievement across Schools
In this section, we bring out two basic facts. There are large systematic differ-
ences in the rates at which different schools produce high math achievers related to 
the schools’ demographics. And there are also large differences among seemingly 
similar schools.
A. Achievement Gaps
In this section we explore the magnitude of various achievement gaps among 
 high-achieving math students by examining the relationship between the number 
28 In the full set of 3,105 schools that we matched to the NCES data, the mean number of students scoring 
at least 100 on the AMC 12 is 0.93, reflecting that the dropped schools (which are mostly private, magnet, or 
 magnet-like) have more high-scorers per school. 
Table 2—School-Level Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD
Count AMC  > 100 0.80 1.87
Count AMC  > 120 0.11 0.49
Count AMC  > 100 female 0.12 0.45
Count AMC  > 120 female 0.01 0.11
Number of students 1,452.02 819.90
School fraction Asian 0.07 0.12
School fraction Black 0.09 0.14
School fraction Hispanic 0.09 0.13
School fraction female 0.49 0.02
Title I school 0.21 0.41
School fraction free lunch 0.15 0.14
log(zip median income) 10.84 0.38
Adult fraction BA 0.20 0.09
Adult fraction grad 0.13 0.09
Zip fraction urban 0.78 0.32
Count perfect SAT/ACT 1.67 3.59
Average SAT/ACT 526.73 41.79
SAT/ACT participation 221.06 153.53
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of  high AMC scorers in a school and its demographics. The first column of Table 3 
presents coefficient estimates (with standard errors in parentheses) from a negative 
binomial regression with the number of students in a school scoring at least 100 on 
the AMC 12 as the dependent variable. The estimates indicate that several observ-
able characteristics of a school/neighborhood are strong predictors of the number of 
high math achievers that a school will produce. Parental education is very important: 
a one percentage point increase in the fraction of adults with bachelor’s and graduate 
degrees increases the expected number of AMC  high-scorers by 2.5 and 7.0 percent, 
respectively. Racial and ethnic composition also matters. The estimates suggest that 
a one percentage point increase in the  Asian American population increases the 
expected number of AMC high-scorers by 1.8 percent. We also find that there are 
fewer high AMC scorers in schools that have more Hispanic students and those that 
have more  low-income students qualifying for the free lunch program.
One demographic variable that would be significant in most regressions of 
 school-mean standardized test scores on demographics that does not have the 
expected effect here is that the number of AMC high-scorers is not higher in 
 higher-income areas. Several potential explanations for the lack of an income effect 
are possible: e.g., it could reflect nonlinearity in the  income-AMC relationship 
( AMC-participating schools are disproportionately located in upper-income areas) 
or it could be due to a selection effect with participating schools in  low-income areas 
being highly nonrepresentative.29
B. Magnitudes of Differences among Seemingly Similar Schools
In this section, we document that there are also large differences among seem-
ingly similar schools. One way to do this is via the negative binomial regression 
estimates. One justification for the negative binomial model is if the number of 
high-scorers in school  i is Poisson with mean  e  X i β  u i , with  u i being a multiplicative 
 gamma-distributed unobserved shock to a school’s production rate that has mean 1 
and variance  α .30 For example, a school would have a  u i of 0.5 if each of its students 
were only one-half as likely to score 100 on the AMC 12 as were students at the 
average school with comparable demographics, and a  u i of 1.5 if its students were 
50 percent more likely to succeed than would be expected given the demographics. 
In our negative binomial regression of the number of students scoring at least 100 on 
the AMC 12 on school demographics, the estimated variance of the multiplicative 
random shock is  α ̂ = 0.73 . A variance of 0.73 corresponds to a standard deviation 
of 0.85, i.e., a school that is one standard deviation above average is producing AMC 
 high-scorers at 185 percent of the average rate and a school that is one standard devi-
ation below average is producing AMC high-scorers at just 15 percent of the average 
rate. For the variance to be this large there must be a substantial number of schools 
29 The income effect becomes smaller in magnitude but remains negative and significant if we drop the Title 1 
and free lunch variables. 
30 This model is sometimes referred to as the Negbin 2 model. See, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi (1986) and 
Greene (2008) for a discussion of negative binomial functional forms. 
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producing AMC high-scorers at a small fraction of the average rate and/or a number 
of schools producing AMC high-scorers at two or more times the average rate.31
31 The estimate is highly significant and a likelihood ratio test rejects the Poisson alternative at an extremely 
high significance level. 
Table 3—Demographic Predictors of High Math Achievement
Count of high-scorers in school
Perfect Female
Variable AMC12  ≥ 100 AMC12  ≥ 120 SAT/ACT AMC12  ≥ 100
log(number of students) 1.14 1.13 1.47 1.23 1.22 1.38
(0.10) (0.12) (0.28) (0.07) (0.17) (0.22)
Adult fraction BA 2.50 2.10 6.74 1.34 1.27 3.14
(0.73) (0.78) (1.81) (0.49) (0.49) (1.44)
Adult fraction grad 7.04 7.32 7.75 5.33 5.29 7.01
(0.54) (0.67) (1.18) (0.35) (0.74) (0.94)
School fraction Asian 1.81 1.80 2.17 2.35 2.36 1.74
(0.28) (0.30) (0.62) (0.16) (0.34) (0.48)
School fraction Black −0.77 −0.60 −1.44 −1.18 −1.26 −1.19
(0.43) (0.44) (1.34) (0.32) (0.36) (1.00)
School fraction Hispanic −1.77 −1.77 −3.26 −0.83 −0.86 −1.55
(0.45) (0.48) (1.43) (0.31) (0.31) (0.98)
log(zip median income) −0.70 −0.67 −1.40 −0.18 −0.14 −0.72
(0.15) (0.16) (0.35) (0.10) (0.10) (0.28)
School free lunch fraction −2.26 −2.47 −3.72 −2.56 −2.39 −2.70
(0.59) (0.64) (1.80) (0.44) (0.53) (1.30)
Title 1 school −0.04 −0.04 −0.23 0.02 0.01 0.03
(0.11) (0.11) (0.29) (0.07) (0.07) (0.22)
Zip fraction urban 0.20 0.20 0.60 0.46 0.49 0.14
(0.24) (0.25) (0.78) (0.18) (0.18) (0.55)
School fraction female −0.30 −0.36 1.86 2.57 2.53 2.77
(2.24) (2.26) (5.94) (1.53) (1.56) (4.69)
log(SAT/ACT participation) 0.95 0.95
(0.10) (0.15)
Constant −2.35 −2.65 −1.73 −7.66 −7.98 −7.48
(2.00) (2.10) (4.87) (1.44) (1.68) (4.01)
log-likelihood −1,899.1 −1,893.6 −493.4 −2,372.5 −2,371.5 −605.6
Pseudo  R 2 0.19 0.21 0.27 0.19
Estimation method NB semi-P NB NB semi-P NB
Estimated var( u i ) 0.73 0.96 2.18 0.23 0.23 0.95 (standard error) (0.08) (0.17) (0.50) (0.03) (0.09) (0.29)
Observations 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984 1,984
High scorers 1,596 1,596 211 3,307 3,307 243
Notes: Results of negative binomial regression and semiparametric model estimation. Outcomes are counts of high 
achievers (students scoring more than 100 or 120 on the AMC 12 or with 800 (36) on the SAT (ACT) math) in 
each school. 
Sources: School demographics are from the NCES Common Core of Data for 2005–2006; zip code demographics 
are from the 2000 US census. The school sample includes coed, noncharter, nonmagnet public schools that offered 
the 2007 AMC 12.
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We conclude that demographic differences account for a substantial portion of the 
variation across schools in the number of students who achieve high AMC scores, 
but that there are also substantial differences across seemingly similar schools.
IV. Distributions of “School Effects”
We noted above that the negative binomial model can be regarded as providing 
an estimate of the variance of the unobserved school effects that we would need in 
addition to the demographic differences to reproduce the observed heterogeneity in 
the counts of AMC high-scorers. Excess variance, however, can take many forms: it 
may be due to a set of underachieving schools that produce very few high-scorers, 
or to a small (or large) set of extreme (or not so extreme) overachieving schools, 
etc. In this section, we provide estimates of the distribution of school effects that 
would lead to the distribution of outcomes observed in the data. One observation is 
that the distribution includes a thick tail of schools that produce many more AMC 
high-scorers than one would expect given their demographics.
Suppose the number of AMC high-scorers in school  i ,  y i , is distributed  Poisson ( λ i ) , where  λ i =  e  X i  β  u i ,  X i is a vector of observable characteristics, and  u i is an 
unobserved “school effect” with a multiplicative effect on the Poisson rate. We 
assume that the school effect  u i has an unknown density  f . Appendix A1 describes a 
methodology for estimating both the coefficients β on the observable characteristics 
and the distribution  f of the unobserved school effects. In a nutshell, we estimate 
the density via a series estimator: we model  f  (x) as a product of a  gamma-like 
term,  x α e −x , similar to that used in the negative binomial model and an orthogo-
nal polynomial expansion, note that different coefficients on the polynomial terms 
produce different likelihoods of seeing 0, 1, 2, etc. high-scorers, and use maximum 
likelihood estimation to find a density that comes closest to matching the observed 
frequencies of the outcomes conditional on the demographics.
We estimate the model on the same dataset as the negative binomial regression of 
the previous section: we use the count of students scoring at least 100 on the AMC 12 
as the dependent variable and include the same set of demographic controls. The 
second column of Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients on the demographic 
controls. They are similar to the negative binomial estimates in the first column, 
indicating that those estimates are robust to the more flexible modeling of the unob-
served heterogeneity. Indeed, a comparison of the maximized  log-likelihoods at the 
bottom of the table shows that the  semiparametric model fits the data only slightly 
better than the negative binomial model discussed in the previous section, suggest-
ing that the true distribution of the  u i is fairly similar to a gamma distribution.32
Our primary interest here is in the distribution of the school effects. We note first 
in Table 3 that relaxing the assumption that the  u i are  gamma-distributed increases 
the estimated variance from 0.73 to 0.96. Panel A of Figure 1 graphs the probability 
density function from which the unobserved school effects  u i are estimated to be 
32 See Table 5 in the online Appendix for a comparison of predicted counts under the Poisson, negative bino-
mial, and  semiparametric models to the actual counts in the data. The table includes, for each model, a  χ 2 test of 
 goodness-of-fit; the tests confirm our visual assessment that the actual data reject the Poisson model at a high level 
of significance, but they do not reject the negative binomial or  semi-parametric models at conventional levels, hav-
ing  p-values of  0.7 in each case. 
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drawn. The  x -axis corresponds to different possible values of the unobserved effect: 
e.g., a value of  u = 1 corresponds to a school that produces AMC 12  high-scorers 
at exactly the mean rate given its demographics, a value of  u = 0.5 corresponds 
to a school that produces  high-scorers at half of this rate, etc. Informally, the 
curve is like a histogram giving the relative frequency of the values of  u in the 
population of schools. Substantial differences between schools with similar demo-
graphics are evident: the distribution is not tightly concentrated around  u = 1 . 
Instead, there are a large number of schools that produce AMC 12 high-scorers 
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Figure 1. Estimated Distribution of School Effects: AMC 12 High Scores
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high-scorers at less than half of the average rate. At the other end, there are many 
highly successful schools producing high-scoring students at 50 to 100 percent 
above the average rate. The dashed lines in the figure are 95 percent confidence 
bands for the estimated density.33 They indicate that the estimates are fairly precise 
throughout most of the range.
A striking feature of the distribution that is not immediately apparent from the 
probability density function (PDF) graph is that the estimates indicate that there is a 
thick upper tail of extremely successful schools. Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates this 
better by graphing in bold the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the esti-
mated distribution for  u ranging from 2 to 8. The estimates indicate that 11 percent 
of schools are estimated to be producing high-scorers at more than twice the average 
rate and there is a substantial mass (about 1 percent) producing high-achieving stu-
dents at more than five times the average rate for a school with their demographics. 
The dashed lines again give a 95 percent confidence interval. They indicate that the 
thick tail is a statistically significant phenomenon.
V. Challenges to the Interpretation of the School Effects
As we noted earlier, the “school effects” we have estimated conflate multiple 
factors. They will reflect differences in causal effects of school environments on 
potential high math achievers. But they will also reflect other less interesting sources 
of outcome heterogeneity: demographic differences not captured by variables in our 
dataset; differences in unobserved student ability attributable to location decisions 
made by parents of gifted children; and even less interestingly, differences in the 
fraction of the  high-achieving math students at each school who take the AMC 12 
test. In this section, we present several auxiliary estimates aimed at providing some 
insights on the importance of these less interesting sources of outcome heterogene-
ity. We will argue that they do not seem sufficient to account for the variation we 
have found.
A. Selection into  Test-Taking: Evidence from Extreme High Achievers
A portion of the “school effects” we have reported will be due to differences 
in the AMC 12 participation rates for  high-achieving math students from different 
schools. The primary way in which we can provide some evidence of whether this 
could be driving our results is to provide additional estimates derived from counts 
of students at even higher achievement levels.
Students scoring at least 120 on the AMC 12 can be thought of as well above the 
99.9th percentile among college-bound students. The unique ability of the AMC 12 
to distinguish among such extreme high achievers makes it possible to examine 
their agglomeration as well. We think that there are many students at  AMC-offering 
schools who would have scored 100 if they had taken the AMC 12, but who did not 
take the test. We believe, however, that the fraction of students at  AMC-offering 
33 The confidence bands in this figure were generated using the parametric bootstrap procedure as described in 
the online Appendix. We also generated confidence bands using the nonparametric bootstrap procedure described 
there. They are quite similar (though slightly wider). 
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schools who would have scored 120 if they took the AMC 12, yet chose not to 
participate, is much smaller. Hence, we can compare results obtained with an 
AMC 12 cutoff of 100 to results obtained with an AMC 12 cutoff of 100 to see if 
results change when selection into  test-taking becomes less important. Moreover, 
we believe that the issue of selection into  test-taking is small in absolute terms at 
the 120 level and hence results with the 120 threshold cannot be greatly affected by 
selection into test-taking. We believe this for a few reasons. First, scoring 120 on 
the AMC 12 requires both a great deal of natural ability and a lot of effort dedicated 
to learning high school mathematics very well and we feel that it is unlikely that 
students would have made the effort if they were not interested in participating in 
math competitions. We see this as analogous to saying that there are unlikely to be 
many high school students who can throw a curveball and a 90 mph fastball who are 
not participating in competitive baseball.34 Second, we can provide some statistical 
evidence from looking at repeat  test-takers across years. Considering the set of stu-
dents who were among the top 1 percent of eleventh graders on the 2006 AMC 12 
and attended a school that participated in the 2007 AMC 12, we are able to identify 
80 percent as taking the AMC 12 in 2007.35 Third, we can look at students who 
received other math honors and see if they had taken the AMC 12. In the 2007 Intel 
Science Talent Search five students were named as finalists on the basis of having 
done outstanding mathematical research projects. We know from the published lists 
of AMC winners that all five took the 2007 AMC 12. Of the 30 winners or honorable 
mentions on the Georgia math contest mentioned earlier, we know that 100 percent 
(all 30 of 30) took the 2007 AMC 12. In the case of the Massachusetts contest men-
tioned earlier, 17 of the 20 winners took the 2007 AMC 12.36 These comparisons 
suggest that the number of  nontakers in our schools who would have scored 120 is 
at most 10 percent to 20 percent of the number who did score 120.
The third column of Table 3 presents estimates from a negative binomial regres-
sion using  school-level counts of students scoring at least 120 on the AMC 12 
as the dependent variable. The coefficients on parental education, income, and 
racial/ethnic variables are all quite similar to those derived from counts of students 
scoring at least 100 on the AMC 12, though the point estimates are generally larger 
in magnitude. None of the differences are statistically significant, with the excep-
tion of the coefficient on the fraction of adults with bachelor’s degrees. The most 
important estimate for our current purposes is that for the parameter  α ̂ , the estimated 
variance of the unobserved school effects  u i . The estimate of 2.18 not only remains 
highly significant in this environment in which we think selection into  test-taking is 
unimportant, but is substantially larger than the estimate from the regression run at 
the AMC 100 level. This bolsters the case that the earlier results were not primarily 
34 Anecdotally, we have discussed discoveries of star students with many math team coaches. Many have stories 
that involve students they had not known showing up to an AMC or some other test and doing very well. None, how-
ever, involved an initial encounter in which a student did something as impressive as scoring 120 on the AMC 12. 
35 This statistic underestimates participation because we have no way to match students who wrote their names 
differently or changed schools from one year to the next. To get some sense of what might be done with manual 
matching and local knowledge, we manually matched all students from Massachusetts who scored at least 110 on 
the 2013 AMC 12A and were still in high school to the 2014 published AMC 12 winners lists. Here, we found 11 
of the 12 2013 high-scorers on the 2014 winners list. 
36 The other three winners also participated in the AMC series, but were younger and chose to take the AMC 
10 rather than the AMC 12. 
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driven by differences in participation rates. And it provides a new striking result 
on extreme high math achievement: school environments appear to be even more 
important in influencing whether students will reach this very high level.
B. Unobserved Demographic Differences: Evidence from SAT/ACT High-Scorers
Another portion of the “school effects” we have reported will be due to unob-
served demographic differences. For example, a school may do well because many 
of its parents with graduate degrees are PhDs in mathematical and technical fields, 
or because it attracts many parents of  high-ability children (perhaps because its dis-
trict has a gifted program that is highly regarded even if it is not effective). In this 
section, we present some evidence on the magnitude of unobserved demographic 
differences by estimating school effects using counts of students achieving perfect 
scores on the SAT and ACT math tests.37
The fourth column of Table 3 presents estimates from a negative binomial regres-
sion with the same demographic controls as before. The most important estimate 
for our current purposes is again the parameter  α ̂ giving the estimated variance of 
the unobserved school effects  u i . The estimate of 0.23 is statistically significant at 
the 0.1 percent level, indicating that there are unobserved demographic differences 
and/or differences in how well the schools in our sample prepare their students to 
get very high math SAT/ACT scores. But the magnitude of the coefficient here is 
much smaller than the estimates of 0.73 and 2.18 we had obtained when looking at 
students scoring 100 or 120 on the AMC 12. This suggests that the differences in 
the counts of AMC high-scorers are not primarily due to unobserved differences 
in demographics or student abilities. One story that would be consistent with both 
results is that there might be more heterogeneity in the extent to which schools 
encourage students to develop the deeper understanding of high school mathematics 
needed to perform well on the AMC: most schools see it as their responsibility to 
teach students the math that appears on the SAT but there may be more heteroge-
neity in whether schools feel that it is important to offer additional enrichment to 
gifted math students.
Figure 2 presents estimated distributions of school effects from the data on 
SAT/ACT high-scorers. The estimated PDF in the top part of the figure has one 
clear difference from the PDF of the AMC school effects: the distribution is much 
closer to being symmetric about the  u = 1 mean whereas the AMC distribution was 
skewed to the right. One implication is that there are significantly fewer (14 percent 
versus 32 percent) schools that are more than 50 percent below average in production 
of high scores on the SAT/ACT than there are at producing high scores on the AMC. 
A second striking difference is apparent in panel B: the SAT/ACT distribution has 
a much thinner upper tail. In the SAT data, only 2 percent of schools are estimated 
to produce high-scorers at more than twice the average rate, and just 0.02 percent 
are estimated to produce high-scorers at more than five times the average rate. This 
contrasts with our earlier estimates that 11 percent of schools that were estimated to 
produce AMC 12 high-scorers at more than twice the average rate and 1.0 percent 
37 Recall that we prioritize SAT scores in this calculation, counting a student who took both exams as having a 
perfect score if and only if he or she had a perfect score on the math portion of the SAT reasoning test. 
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at more than five times the average rate. We interpret this contrast as suggesting that 
the thick upper tail in the AMC 12 school effects distribution is not primarily due to 
differences in unmeasured student characteristics.
The estimated coefficients on the demographic variables are generally quite 
similar in the SAT/ACT and AMC estimations, and the former are again similar 
regardless of whether the coefficients are obtained from negative binomial regres-
sion, shown in the fourth column of Table 3, or from our  semiparametric estimation, 
shown in the fifth column. The fact that observed demographics affect the AMC and 
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Figure 2. Estimated Distribution of School Effects: High SAT/ACT Scores
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also have similar effects in the two regressions. Assuming this to be the case, the fact 
that the estimated  α ̂ in the SAT/ACT regression is so much smaller than that in the 
AMC regression would imply that at most 32 percent of the variance in the AMC 
school effects is due to unobserved demographic differences. We regard this as a 
conservative bound because the SAT/ACT school effects reflect more than demo-
graphic differences—we assume that there are idiosyncratic differences in how well 
schools prepare students for the SAT/ACT—and these will be part of what is cap-
tured by the SAT/ACT school effects.
C. Unobserved Demographic Differences: Evidence from Gender Differences
The effects of schools on female students with high math ability are of indepen-
dent interest given the underrepresentation of women in mathematical and techni-
cal fields. Data on the female  high-scorers also provide another potential source of 
information into whether heterogeneous outcomes are driven by unobserved demo-
graphic differences: differences such as whether a district has many parents with 
PhDs should be similarly relevant to male and female students (provided there are 
not large differences in how parents of high-ability girls and boys choose where to 
live). A number of plausible explanations could be given for why there might be 
more agglomeration of  high-achieving girls. For example, the dispersion of school 
effects would be larger for girls if there is variation in how encouraging/discourag-
ing schools are toward girls independent of a general  school-quality effect. Or peer 
effects could be more important for girls. Or the rigor of a school’s classes might be 
more important for girls because they are less liable to complain or take supplemen-
tary online classes.
The last column of Table 3 reports coefficient estimates from a negative binomial 
regression with a count of the number of female students scoring at least 100 on the 
AMC 12 as the dependent variable. Note that the estimated variance of the unob-
served school effects,  α ̂ of 0.95 (standard error 0.29) whereas it was 0.73 (standard 
error 0.08) when we examined  high-scoring students of either gender. This indicates 
that there may be more underlying variation in the rate at which different schools are 
producing  high-achieving girls. The substantial noise in the variance estimates from 
the  girls-only sample, however, is such that we cannot say whether the difference in 
variances is significant.
VI. Mechanisms behind the School Effects
In the preceding sections we argued that a substantial portion of the idiosyncratic 
differences in the rates at which seemingly similar schools produce  high-achieving 
math students are due to some sort of environmental differences. In this section we 
present several additional analyses designed to provide insight into what may be 
leading to these differences.
A. Effects on  High-Achieving Students or Generally Strong Math Programs?
The fact that a school produces many  high-achieving students need not imply that 
the school’s environment particularly benefits  high-achieving students: it could be 
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that the school just has a generally strong math program. If, for example, the math 
program at school  i raises the score of each student  j from  θ j to  θ j +  Δ i , then a school 
with a larger  Δ i will have more students scoring above any particular threshold.
To explore whether this appears to be a large part of what is going with our AMC 
results, we obtained data on the average math SAT/ACT score for students within 
each school, which we think of as reflecting the general quality of the school’s math 
program (as well as observed and unobserved demographics). We then repeated our 
negative binomial regressions of the number of students scoring at least 100 and at 
least 120 on the AMC 12 on the same demographics as before plus two additional 
variables: the average SAT/ACT score in the school and the SAT/ACT participa-
tion rate. We find that the added variables only moderately reduce the estimated 
variance of the school effects. In the AMC  ≥ 100 regression the estimated variance 
α ̂ drops from 0.73 (standard error 0.08) to 0.57 (standard error 0.07). In the AMC 
≥ 120 regression the estimated variance  α ̂ drops from 2.18 (standard error 0.50) to 
1.60 (standard error 0.41).
We also perform a similar exercise in our regressions examining counts of stu-
dents with perfect SAT/ACT scores.38 In the SAT/ACT scores, including this 
measure of the general quality of the math program reduces the unobserved het-
erogeneity nearly to zero; the estimated variance  α ̂ drops from 0.23 (standard error 
0.03) to 0.07 (standard error 0.02).
If one thinks of the difference between the  α ̂ estimated from the AMC data and 
the  α ̂ estimated from the SAT/ACT data as a conservative estimate of the vari-
ance in the school effects that controls for both observed and unobserved demo-
graphic differences, then the finding of this section is that this difference is 
0.50 ( = 0.73 − 0.23 ) when one does not control for the  school-average SAT score 
and also 0.50 ( = 0.57 − 0.07 ) when one does.39 We conclude that a substantial por-
tion of the “school effects” we have reported seems to be due to factors that differ-
entially impact  high-achieving students.
B. Peer Effects or Differences in School Quality?
Although we have sometimes described our estimated “school effects” as reflect-
ing the heterogeneous rates at which schools produce high-scorers, it is more accurate 
to describe them as a quantification of the excess agglomeration of  high-achieving 
students. Agglomeration will occur if there is unobserved heterogeneity in school 
“quality.” But it will also be present if there are peer effects among  high-achieving 
students. In this section, we provide a formal nonidentification result, noting that 
one cannot distinguish peer effects from school quality differences using data on a 
single cross section; we then show that a calculation using data from multiple years 
38 The SAT/ACT participation rate is already included in the controls, so in this exercise we simply add mean 
SAT/ACT score as a covariate. 
39 This comparison is essentially unchanged when we include richer controls for  school-average SAT score and 
participation. The estimated variance  α ̂ in the AMC  ≥ 100 regression drops from 0.57 (standard error 0.07) when 
only linear controls are used to 0.56 (standard error 0.07) when cubic polynomials of mean SAT/ACT and partic-
ipation, plus an interaction between mean SAT/ACT and participation, are included; the equivalent change in the 
SAT/ACT  high-scorers regression is from 0.07 (standard error 0.02) to 0.04 (standard error 0.01). 
1264 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW juNE 2016
suggests that a portion of the school effects we have found are due to peer effects, 
but that a larger portion is not.
The impossibility of distinguishing peer effects from school-quality differences 
can be formalized using standard results on the binomial distribution. First, consider 
a model with no peer effects in which schools differ in unobserved quality (which is 
captured by a  gamma-distributed random variable):
MODEL 1: Suppose the count of high-scorers  Y i ∼ Poisson ( λ i ) with  λ i =  e  X i  β  u i , 
where  u i ∼ Γ ( 1 _α,  1 _α) .40
Second, consider a model with no unobserved heterogeneity  u i in school qual-
ity, but with peer effects between  high-achieving students. Specifically, consider 
a model in which high-scorers are produced in two ways: the school directly pro-
duces  high-scoring students at a Poisson rate; and high-scorers produce additional 
high-scorers via an  infection-style dynamic.
MODEL 2: Suppose a school directly produces high-scoring students at Poisson 
rate  λ ( X i ) during the time interval  [0, 1] . Suppose that in each subinterval  (t, t + dt) , 
each high-scoring student then present produces another  high-scoring student with 
probability  g ( X i ) dt . Let  Y i be the number of high-scoring students at  t = 1 .
The two models are  well known to produce counts that follow the negative bino-
mial distribution.41 As a result, we cannot distinguish between the two models given 
a dataset containing a single observation on each school. Conceptually, the argu-
ment is similar to Ellison and Glaeser’s (1997) argument that unobserved compara-
tive advantages and spillovers can lead to equivalent geographic concentration.
PROPOSITION 1: The distribution of  Y i |  X i under Model 1 with parameters (α, β)
is identical to the distribution of  Y i |  X i under Model 2 if the direct production rate is λ( X i ) =  1 __ α log(1 + α e  X i β ) and the peer infection rate is  g ( X i ) = αλ ( X i ) .
While the peer effects formulas may seem complicated at first, one can think of 
them as saying that it is the ratio of the peer infection rate  g (x) to the direct pro-
duction rate  λ (x) that determines the magnitude  α of the excess variance (relative 
to what one would expect with only direct production). Using the approximation 
log (1 + y) ≈ y , one can think of the formula for the direct production rate as 
λ( X i )  ≈ e  X i β , which is the same functional form as in the unobserved heterogeneity 
model with the unobserved component set equal to its mean.
A model in which there are both school-quality differences and peer effects of 
the form above will not produce an exact negative binomial distribution, but the 
excess variance will still be related to the amount of heterogeneity and the strength 
of the peer effects in a similar manner. Formally, consider a hybrid model in which 
40 The density of the assumed distribution of the  u i is  f (u) =  (1/α)  1 __ α  e − 1 __ α u  u  1 __ α−1 /Γ (1/α) . 
41 In Model 1,  Y i ∼ N B ( 1 __ α,  α e  X i β ________ 1+α e  X i β ) . In Model 2,  Y i  ∼ NB ( λ ( X i ) _____g ( X i ) , 1 −  e −g( X i ) ) . See Boswell and Patil (1970, 
Section 8.2) or Karlin (1966, p. 345) for proofs. 
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school  i directly produces high-scorers at Poisson rate  λ i =  1 __  α p log(1 +  α p  e  X i β   u i ) ≈  e  X i  β  u i during the time interval [0, 1], with  u i being a  gamma-distributed random 
variable with mean 1 and variance  α u . As in Model 2, suppose that each high-scorer 
produces additional high-scorers at Poisson rate  g i =  α p λ i and let  Y i be the number 
of high-scorers at  t = 1 . A calculation gives:
PROPOSITION 2: In the hybrid model we have E( Y i |  X i ) =  e  X i β and 
Var ( Y i |  X i ) = E ( Y i |  X i ) + αE ( Y i |  X i ) 2 for  α =  α u +  α p +  α u  α p .
Hence, although a negative binomial model will be misspecified, one way to inter-
pret an excess variance parameter  α estimated from count data is as a reflection 
of  α u +  α p +  α u  α p , which consists of a sum of the strengths of the two agglomer-
ative forces plus an interaction term.
Suppose now that we are able to observe two conditionally independent 
draws  Y i1 ,  Y i2 for each school. By “conditionally independent” we mean that the 
school characteristics  X i and unobserved quality  u i are the same at both  t = 1 and 
t = 2 , but that the subsequent Poisson realizations are independent and that peer 
infections operate separately within each time period. Define  
_ Y i =  Y i1 +  Y i2 to be 
the sum of the counts of  high-scoring students across the two draws. Suppose that 
with such data one estimates two excess variance parameters: first, treat the  Y it as  2N 
observations and estimate an excess variance parameter  α ; and second, treat the  _ Y i 
as  N observations and estimate an excess variance parameter  
_ α. A result relating the 
estimates to the relative importance of peer effects and unobserved heterogeneity is:
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose  α and  _ α satisfy  0 <  α _2 <  _ α < α . Then there 
is an unique pair of parameters for the hybrid model  ( α u ,  α p ) for which 
Var ( Y i |  X i )  = E ( Y i |  X i )  + αE ( Y i |  X i ) 2 and  Var ( _ Y i |  X i )  = E ( _ Y i |  X i )  +  _ αE ( _ Y i |  X i ) 2 . 
Specifically, this holds for  α u = 2 _ α − α and  α p =  2 (α −  
_ α)
 _1+2 _ α − α .
The result above implies that the reduction in overdispersion that results when 
we sum two observations per school will let us infer the relative importance of peer 
effects and unobserved heterogeneity in generating the overdispersion. Intuitively, 
if the excess variance is due to unobserved heterogeneity in school quality that does 
not change over time, then the combined data from two years should show just as 
much overdispersion as a single year of data. But if the overdispersion is due to 
 within-time-period peer effects, then the overdispersion will decline as we combine 
results from multiple years. It should be kept in mind, of course, that the hybrid 
model uses extreme assumptions: the unobserved school effects  u i are assumed to 
be perfectly persistent; and peer effects are not felt across time periods. In practice, 
school effects would be expected to be imperfectly correlated across time as teach-
ers leave, curricula change, etc.: and peer effects may be relevant even between 
students who are never in school together via chains where student  A infects student 
B who later infects student  C , etc. An application of Proposition 3 will overestimate 
the importance of peer effects if the former factor is more important and underesti-
mate it if the latter dominates.
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To investigate the relative importance of unobserved school effects and peer 
effects in the AMC data we combine the dataset we have examined so far with 
a  comparable dataset containing counts of the number of students in each school 
scoring an equivalent of 100 on the 2003 AMC 12.42 The  four-year interval between 
observations should make observations roughly conditionally independent in that 
the sets of students in the high school in the different test years are nearly disjoint. 
It should also eliminate many  cross-period peer effects although it is possible that a 
student who achieved a high score in 2003 influenced a student still in high school 
in 2007 either directly if the students overlapped at the school at some point in 
 2004–2006 or indirectly via some chain of influence. We hope that the  four-year 
interval is also short enough so that unobserved school qualities will be similar 
across the two years. We restrict our attention to the set of public, nonmagnet, 
 noncharter, public schools which offered the AMC 12 in both 2003 and 2007. The 
subsample includes 1,606 of the 1,984 schools in our previous analyses.
We perform two negative binomial regressions on the combined dataset. First, 
we run the regression with each school’s 2003 and 2007 high-scorer counts being 
treated as two independent observations. The estimated  α in this model is 0.74, 
which is similar to that we found earlier in the 2007 data. Second, we estimated a 
negative binomial regression with just one observation per school using the com-
bined count  
_ Y i ≡  Y i, 2003 +  Y i, 2007 as the dependent variable. The estimated  _ α in this 
model is 0.65. Using the formula in the proposition above we find that the param-
eters mutually consistent with the two estimates are  α u = 0.56 and  α p = 0.12 . We 
conclude that some relatively permanent factor appears to be more important than 
 within-cohort peer effects (or transitory school quality) in producing the observed 
clustering across schools. Again, however, we should emphasize that part of the 
permanent factor could be due to some sort of peer effect of a different sort than is 
normally considered: e.g., it could be due to a community spirit that develops within 
a school and is passed down from one cohort to the next.
Estimates from a regression examining  higher-achieving students scoring an 
equivalent of 120 on the AMC 12 and from analyses of  high-achieving females 
only are similar. For the higher achievement threshold of 120 (and its equivalent of 
126.5 in 2003), the estimated  α and  _ α are 1.93 and 1.49. The parameters mutually 
consistent with the two estimates are  α u = 1.05 and  α p = 0.43 . For female students 
scoring 100 or higher (111.5 or higher in 2003), the estimated  α and  _ α are 0.97 
and 0.84. The parameters mutually consistent with the two estimates are  α u = 0.71 
and  α p = 0.15 . Again, in each case, the persistent factor affecting performance 
across years appears to dominate the inferred strength of transitory peer effects.
C. Informal Evidence on  High-Achieving Schools
To get additional insight into what  upper-tail schools might be doing to pro-
mote high math achievement, we present some informal descriptive evidence 
42 As before differences in difficulty across tests make it desirable to adjust the cutoff when using different tests. 
We use a cutoff of 111.5 rather than 100 on the 2003 AMC 12A because that makes the fraction of students scoring 
at least equal to the cutoff as close as possible to the fraction scoring 100 on the 2007 AMC 12A. 
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about schools that produce an unexpectedly large number of AMC high-scorers.43 
Specifically, Table 4 presents data on 20  high-achieving schools along with sam-
ple means for these schools and for 20 comparison schools.44 The  high-achieving 
schools averaged 6.9 students scoring at least 100 on the AMC 12, whereas the 
comparison schools averaged 1.0.
One initial comment about the  high-performing schools is that most are ordi-
narily situated public high schools. One, Oak Ridge HS in Oak Ridge, TN, is located 
near a national laboratory. A second, Cardozo HS, is located within New York City, 
which has extensive school choice. But most do not seem unusual and more than 
half are either the unique comprehensive high school in their school district, or one 
of just two or three comprehensive schools in districts that primarily divide students 
geographically and offer similar programs at each of their schools.
Comparing the summary statistics we note several differences between the 
 high-achieving schools and the matched comparison group. One clear difference is 
that the  high-achieving schools were much more likely to have “star” math teach-
ers.45 In some cases star teachers seem extremely important (and impressive). 
43 We selected 20 schools for which  E ( u i |  y i ) is largest when we assume that the school effects  u i are indepen-
dent draws from the distribution estimated under our semiparametric model, and  y i , the count of students scoring 
at least 100 on the AMC 12, is also assumed to be generated as in the model with the estimated parameters. Note 
that in order to have a high posterior mean, observations from the school will need to be highly informative, which 
results in these schools tending both to have a high ratio of actual to predicted high-scorers and a large number of 
 high-scorers. 
44 For each school, we chose as a comparison the school in the same state which was most similar demograph-
ically in the sense of minimizing |  X i −  X j | ′ |  β ̂ |. 
45 To define this variable we labeled a school as having a star math teacher if a math teacher’s name appeared on 
the school’s Wikipedia page or if Google searches revealed that the math team coach was active beyond the school 
Table 4—A List of High-Achieving Schools
School Location
AMC  > 100 Post.
Mean
  












Vestavia Hills HS Birmingham, AL 19 1.6 8.9 Y 3/4 N Yes-1
Terre Haute S. Vigo Terre Haute, IN 7 0.5 7.6 Y 2/2 N N
Canton HS Canton, MA 6 0.4 7.2 Y 3/3 N Yes-1
Lassiter HS Marietta, GA 8 0.9 6.3 Y 3/3 Y N
Lincoln East HS Lincoln, NE 8 1.0 5.8 Y 3/2 N N
Westford Academy Westford, MA 12 1.8 5.7 N 3/4 N N
Mark Keppel HS Alhambra, CA 8 1.1 5.6 N 3/3 N N
Revere HS Richfield, OH 4 0.3 5.3 N 2/3 N N
O’Connor HS Helotes, TX 6 0.7 5.1 N 2/2 Y N
Grace King HS Metairie, LA 4 0.4 4.5 N Unknown Unknown Unknown
Moses Lake HS Moses Lake, WA 3 0.2 4.5 N 2/2 N N
Carlmont HS Belmont, CA 8 1.4 4.1 N 3/2 Y N
Portland HS Portland, ME 3 0.2 3.8 N 3/4 N N
Sycamore HS Cincinnati, OH 11 2.1 3.8 Y 4/4 Y Yes-1
Georgetown HS Georgetown, TX 3 0.3 3.7 N 4/2 N Yes-1
Oak Ridge HS Conroe, TX 3 0.3 3.5 N 4/4 N N
Pearland HS Pearland, TX 4 0.5 3.5 N 2/2 N N
Oak Ridge HS Oak Ridge, TN 5 0.8 3.4 Y 4/4 Y Yes-2
Cardozo HS Bayside, NY 12 2.8 3.1 N 3/3 N Yes-1,2
Manzano HS Albuquerque, NM 3 0.4 3.0 Y 2/2 N N
Mean for 20 high-achieving schools 6.9 0.9 4.9 0.4 2.9/2.9 0.3 0.3
Mean for 20 comparison schools 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.0 2.2/2.3 0.1 0.0
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For example, for over 40 years Lincoln East’s Leona Penner taught their top math 
students for four years in a row from seventh through tenth grade and followed a 
 special curriculum that focused “more on number theory, problem solving, logic 
and proof than the traditional curriculum.”46 Popular press stories suggest a com-
bination of reasons for other stars’ success including knowledge, work ethic, and a 
remarkable facility for motivating students to put in extra effort. For example, in dis-
cussing how Honey Creek’s Robert Fischer had managed to coach teams to 17 state 
and 1 national championship in math, 21 state and 4 national championships in 
chess, and 35 county championships in tennis, USA Today noted that he “starts his 
day at 5:30 am and draws  35–50 students for an hour of  before-school math; holds 
Lunch Math through lunch periods; coaches Mathcounts and tennis after school” 
(Schneider 2001).47
There also appear to be differences in the curricular offerings. In looking at the 
most standard high school courses, geometry and algebra II, we found that the 
 high-achieving schools tend to stratify their math offerings more finely: they typ-
ically offer three levels of these classes whereas the comparison schools usually 
offer two. They are also more likely to offer multivariable calculus: we found such 
courses at five of the high-achieving schools and just two of the comparison schools. 
The final column records observations of additional special curricular offerings. The 
“−1” notation marks five schools which offer some type of additional math course 
which includes problem solving and/or math competition in its description. Often 
the descriptions indicate that the classes offer a variety of types of enrichment.48 
The most striking example is that of the  top-ranked school, Vestavia Hills HS, at 
which students may in addition to their regular math course enroll each year in an 
extra  one-half or  full-credit “Honors Math Theory” class that meets every day before 
school and/or during lunch. The “−2” notation marks schools that offer classes to 
prepare students for research competitions, which is something we found at two 
 high-achieving and one comparison school.
Again, we should note that in dropping schools with  magnet-like programs we 
are omitting many  high-achieving schools where it is easy to identify institutions 
designed to promote high achievement. For example, the Rockdale Magnet School 
for Science and Technology, which we mentioned earlier, has a number of unusual 
curricular offerings, including a  two-year sequence covering single and multivari-
able calculus with linear algebra and differential equations, a history of mathe-
matics elective, and (in some years) an extra math team course. The courses were 
environment, was the subject of a glowing portrayal on a nonaffiliated site, or had won highly prestigious honors 
such as being on the USA Today  All-USA Teaching Team. 
46 Her middle school math teams won the Nebraska state Mathcounts championship in 26 of her last 29 years 
and she won a number of other awards (Reist 2012). Other  long-serving stars include Canton’s Martin Badoian, 
whose math teams won 19 state championships in one 21-year period and who still teaches at age 86 (Redd 2004), 
and Vestavia Hills’ Kay Tipton, who founded their math team in 1975 and went on to win the Mu Alpha Theta 
national championship at least 14 times (Chalkboard Champions 2013). 
47 Fischer teaches at Honey Creek Middle School, which feeds into Terre Haute South Vigo. 
48 For example, Georgetown’s Independent Study in Mathematics course description says, “This course 
will extend mathematical understanding beyond the Algebra II level in a specific area or areas of mathematics, 
such as theory of equations, number theory,  non-Euclidean geometry, discrete mathematics, advanced survey of 
 mathematics, or history of mathematics. This course will provide students opportunities to pursue interest in math-
ematical topics via independent research, directed learning, preparation for and participation in challenging mathe-
matics competitions, and/or mentoring by a mathematics professional.” 
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designed by a star teacher, Dr. Charles Garner, and the school also has an active 
math team.49 In a personal communication, Dr. Garner attributed his students’ 
 success on the AMC to “the hard work they do to develop these  problem-solving 
skills” and noted that “very, very few of our students walk into ninth grade with a 
love of math!”
In summary, a quick look at the  high-achieving schools suggests that multiple 
factors may be involved in these schools’ success. In several cases a star teacher 
may be playing an important role. And there also seem to be institutional differences 
including decisions by the schools to stratify classes more finely and offer additional 
classes that provide enrichment and/or contest preparation in addition to the stan-
dard high school course sequences.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper we have used data on the Mathematical Association of America’s 
AMC 12 exam to provide a look at  high-achieving math students in US high schools. 
Our most basic observation is that they are highly agglomerated. Much of this is 
associated with strong demographic predictors of high math achievement: even 
though our sample consists mostly of relatively  high-performing schools in rela-
tively affluent areas we note that both the presence of  Asian American students and 
parents with advanced degrees are strong predictors of which schools will produce 
 high-achieving students. But beyond this we find that there are also large differences 
among seemingly similar schools.
As a first step in exploring these differences we estimated the distribution of the 
unobserved “school effects” that would be needed to produce the observed patterns. 
Methodologically, we note that this distribution can be estimated (and estimated 
fairly precisely in our data) even though almost all schools only have a handful of 
 high-scorers. The most interesting aspect of the estimated distribution is that it has 
a thick upper tail. Many (about 200) of the schools in our sample appear to be pro-
ducing AMC high-scorers at more than twice the expected rate and some (about 20) 
are producing them at five to ten times the expected rate.
We have presented a number of pieces of auxiliary evidence to suggest that there 
are real differences in school environments. To examine selection into  test-taking 
we take advantage of the AMC’s ability to identify students at even higher percen-
tiles where we think selection is not important and note that school effects appear 
to be even more important. To get some idea of the portion of our school effects 
which are due to unobserved differences in student ability we estimated the dis-
persion in the rates at which the schools in our sample produce students with high 
SAT/ACT scores. We found that the variance was only 30 percent as large. To the 
extent that some portion of the SAT school effects are due to differences in school 
quality, the message that we are not primarily finding unobserved demographic dif-
ferences becomes even stronger. Also, no comparable upper tail is visible in the 
SAT/ACT data.
49 Dr. Garner has been active outside his school both with the Georgia Department of Education and in math 
competition communities, has won various awards, and written a calculus textbook and edited several other books. 
1270 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW juNE 2016
Our primary focus is on documenting that there appear to be substantial differ-
ences in the rates at which different schools produce high math achievers. In our final 
section we tried to provide some additional evidence into mechanisms that may be 
involved. Methodologically, we bring out how peer effects and differences in school 
quality can produce agglomeration patterns that are indistinguishable given data in a 
single  cross section but potentially distinguishable given data on both within-cohort 
agglomeration and  cross-cohort coagglomeration. Our estimates here suggest that 
there are some peer effects especially at the highest level of students scoring 120 on 
the AMC 12 (or that a portion of the school effects are time varying). This may be 
an interesting result on its own. But, the more important message is that majority of 
the effect is something that is a more permanent feature of schools (although it could 
also be some other peer effect such as a sense of community that reproduces itself 
from one cohort to the next).
Our finding that schools matter for high achievement can be seen as contrary 
to the findings of several recent studies that particular gifted programs appear to 
have little impact on marginal students. Our view, however, is that there need not 
be any conflict here. The previous literature mostly focuses on how elite programs 
affect marginal students whereas we are focused on how they affect students at the 
extreme opposite tail. Our evaluation metric is also different in that we are focused 
on in depth understanding and advanced problem solving skills. Something we have 
not emphasized much is that there is a potential complementarity to bridging the 
gap between their school samples and ours. In dropping private schools and magnet 
programs from our sample we have dropped the schools attended by over 40 percent 
of the AMC  high-scorers from our sample. Accordingly, getting more of a sense of 
whether magnet programs are effective on their most able students would be of great 
practical importance.
Our findings about the thick upper tail are intriguing because they suggest that the 
United States could dramatically increase the number of  high-achieving math students 
it produces. Of course, this would require that the effects be due to environmental 
differences and the environments are something that could be reproduced. But given 
the importance of  high-achieving students to the economy and the potential benefits 
to students we hope that our paper will spur future research on these topics. The 
potential gains may also be much larger than what one sees in the schools we have 
studied. Ninety percent of US high schools do not offer the AMC. If we were able to 
examine the rates at which students in those schools develop  high-level math skills 
we might have found much larger differences and many students who might have 
reached high achievement levels if they had attended a typical school in our sample.
Appendix
In this Appendix we describe how we estimate the distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity and present some simulation results on the method.
A.1 Estimation Methodology
Suppose  y i is distributed  Poisson  ( λ i ) , where  λ i =  e  z i β  u i ,  z i is a vector of observ-
able characteristics, and  u i is an unobserved characteristic with a multiplicative 
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effect on the Poisson rate. Assume that the  u i are i.i.d. random variables independent 
of the  z i with continuous density  f on  (0, ∞) and  E ( u i ) = 1 . We wish to estimate 
both the coefficients  β on the observable characteristics and the distribution  f of the 
unobserved effects.
Our approach is similar to that of Gurmu, Rilstone, and Stern (1999) in that we 
use a series expansion and exploit known properties of the orthogonal polynomials 
involved to facilitate maximum likelihood estimation.50
Given any function  f and any constant  α we can write  f  (x)  =  x α e −x g (x) . If  g (x) 
is well behaved in the sense that  ∫ x=0 ∞  x α e −x | g (x)  | 2 dx < ∞ , then  g (x) can be repre-
sented as a convergent sum
  g (x) =  ∑ 
j=0
∞
  g j  L  j (α) (x) ,
where  L  j (α) (x) is the  j th generalized Laguerre polynomial,  L  j (α) (x) 
≡  ∑ i=0 j (−1) i ( j+α j−i )   x i  _i!  .51 Expressing the distribution in this way makes it possible 
to evaluate the likelihood of each outcome without integrating over the unobserved 
parameter  u i .
PROPOSITION 4: Consider the model described above. Then,
Pr { y i = k |  z i } = 
   e k z i β ______________  
 ( e  z i β + 1) k+α+1 
 [ ∑ k 
ℓ=0
 
Γ(ℓ + α + 1)  __________ℓ!  e −ℓ z i β (−1 ) ℓ  ( k + α k − ℓ ) ∑ j=ℓ
∞
  g j (  e  z i β  ______  e  z i β +1) 
j
 ( j+α j−ℓ ) ] .
The derivation of the formula exploits several properties of the Laguerre polynomi-
als. Details are given in the online Appendix.
Given the formula above it is natural to estimate the model by maximum likeli-
hood: we simply treat  β ,  α , and the  g j as parameters to be estimated as in a series 
50 Our motivation for estimating the distribution as we do rather than directly following Gurmu, Rilstone, and 
Stern (1999) or Brännäs and Rosenqvist (1994) is that previous Monte Carlo studies have suggested that they may 
not work well in a situation like ours where we suspect that the distribution is  fat-tailed. This is intuitive: Gurmu, 
Rilstone, and Stern is based on a flexible estimation of the  moment-generating function, which is not well defined 
for a  fat-tailed distribution such as the log-normal. Our approach will have some drawbacks relative to that of 
Gurmu, Rilstone, and Stern (1999). Most notably, their approach can be applied to any conditional mean function 
whereas ours works only for conditional mean functions of the form E(y | X) =  e Xβ . Their expansion is also guar-
anteed to produce a valid estimated density whereas our estimated densities can take on negative values. 
51 The coefficients  g j are given by
 g j =  ∫ 0 ∞  L j 
(α) (x)
 _
 ( j+α j ) 
 g (x)  x α e −x _ Γ (α + 1) dx. 
When  α is not an integer the binomial coefficients are generalized binomial coefficients defined via the gamma 
function. Note that the parameter  α in this section is a completely different parameter from the  α we talked about 
in connection with the negative binomial model. We recognize that this has the potential to cause confusion, but felt 
we should use  α for both parameters because this is how textbook discussions of the negative binomial model and 
of generalized Laguerre polynomials will refer to the parameters. 
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estimation.52 For the estimated  f  (u) to be a valid density with  E (u) = 1 , the esti-
mated parameters  α,  g 0 ,  g 1 , … ,  g N must be such that
•   ∫ 0 ∞ u α e −u  ∑ j=0 N  g j L j (α) (u)  du = 1 ; and
•   ∫ 0 ∞ u α+1  e −u  ∑ j=0 N  g j  L j (α) (u)  du = 1 ; and
•    u α e −u  ∑ j=0 N  g j  L j (α) (u) ≥ 0 for all  u ∈  (0, ∞) .
The first of these conditions holds if and only if  g 0 = 1/Γ (α+1) . We impose this 
restriction in all of our estimations. Given this restriction, the second condition 
holds if and only if  g 1 = α _ Γ (α+2). One could impose this restriction, but for finite 
N it is not necessary for identification. We have chosen instead not to impose it and 
instead simply renormalize the estimated distribution by dividing the probability 
density function by the expectation after the estimation stage. We have two motiva-
tions for this: first, with the renormalization approach, our model nests the negative 
binomial, whereas it would not if we had imposed the restriction on  g 1 ; and second, 
the model seemed to less often produce estimates that ran into the third nonnega-
tivity constraint when we took the renormalization approach. The third constraint 
is not as easy to express as a parameter restriction, so we do not impose it as a 
constraint. Instead, we add a penalty function of  −log ( ∫ 0 ∞ max (  f ̂ (x) , 0) dx) to the 
 per-observation likelihood function for parameter values that do not generate valid 
densities.53 In practice this has the effect of making the estimated densities at most 
slightly negative.
The function  f  (x) can in theory be estimated consistently by allowing the num-
ber of terms  N to grow at an appropriate rate or by choosing it in other ways like 
 cross-validation. In practice, the number of Laguerre coefficients that can be esti-
mated may be quite limited unless the dataset is very large. It is for this reason 
that we wrote the density in the form  f (x) =  x α e −x  ∑ j=0 N  g j  L j (α) (x) rather than just 
as  e −x  ∑ j=0 N  g j L j (0) (x) . When  N = 0 , the  α parameter gives the model the ability to 
fit a range of plausible densities with just a single estimated parameter: the renormal-
ized distribution with parameter  α has mean 1 and variance  1/ (α + 1) . This allows 
the model produce an exponential distribution ( α = 0 ), unimodal distributions con-
centrated around one (the distribution is unimodal with mode  α _ α+1 if  α > 0 ), and 
distributions with more weight on extreme  u ’s than the exponential ( α ∈ (−1, 0) ).54 
52 Finite sums  g N (x) ≡  ∑ j=0 N  g j  L j (α) (x) will approximate the true distribution as  N → ∞ . Defining 
‖ g −  g N ‖ ≡  ∫ x=0 ∞ (g (x) −  g N (x)) 2   x α e −x  _____Γ (α+1) dx we have  ‖g −  g N ‖ ≤  ∑ j=N+1 ∞ ( j+α j )  g j 2 . 
53 The motivation for the form of the penalty is that, given a weighting function  f ̂ (x) that is not everywhere 
nonnegative, one can define a nonnegative measure by setting  f ̃ (x) = max (  f ̂ (x), 0) / ∫ 0 ∞ max (  f ̂ (x) , 0) dx . The like-
lihood minus the penalty function is a lower bound to the likelihood that would be obtained from the nonnegative 
density  f ̃ (x) . 
54 The pure Poisson model with no unobserved heterogeneity is obtained as a special case as  α → ∞ . The 
negative binomial is also a special case if we adopt the normalization strategy of estimating the distribution without 
the restriction on  g 1 and then rescaling the estimated distribution so that it does have expectation one by dividing 
by its mean. 
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The objective function is not globally concave, so we ran our estimation routines 
from a large number of starting values for  α and the  g i .55
However, once the normalization is done one can calculate the variance of the 
estimated distribution using Laguerre polynomial identities and get an estimated 
variance that can be compared to the  α in the negative binomial model. The normal-
ization strategy we use is to first estimate without the restriction on  g 1 . This gives a 
distribution of shocks  v that have  E (v) = (1 + α) −  g 1 Γ (α + 2) . We get a distri-
bution  u with mean 1 by defining  u = v/((1 + α) −  g 1 Γ (α + 2)). The variance of 
the resulting random variable is
 Var (u) = E ( u 2 ) − E (u) 2 
 =  E ( v 2 ) _
E (v) 2 − 1 =  
Γ (α + 3) g 2 − 2 (α + 2) Γ (α + 2) g 1 + (α + 1) (α + 2)    _________________________________    ( (1 + α) −  g 1 Γ (α + 2) ) 2  − 1. 
If we were to impose the restriction  g 1 =  α _ Γ (α+2) , then the formula simplifies sub-
stantially to
  Var (u) = Γ (α + 3) g 2 −  α 2 − α + 1. 
A.2 Simulation Results
Our primary motivation for estimating the model as described above instead of 
directly following previous approaches is that simulations have suggested that pre-
vious approaches may not work well in practice when the distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity is fat-tailed.56 To assess how our method might work in practice and 
how many terms  N one might want to include in the series expansion we also con-
ducted simulation experiments described in the online Appendix using exponen-
tial,  log-normal, and uniform distributions for the unobserved heterogeneity. A very 
rough summary is that our approach seems to work reasonably well in the expo-
nential and  log-normal cases. Estimating the upper tail is easier than estimating 
the density at low values of  u : it is inherently very difficult to distinguish whether 
a school is producing 0.1 or 0.01  high-achieving students per year. The simulations 
also suggest that including  N = 4 terms in the series expansion may a good choice 
for balancing flexibility versus overfitting given the number of observations in our 
dataset and the magnitudes of the counts. In our empirical analyses, we will gener-
ally present estimates that use  N = 4 terms in the series expansion.
55 For starting values, we used the coefficients from the negative binomial regressions for  β start ; for  α start 
and  g i, start , we tried the mean estimates from the uniform, exponential, and log-normal Monte Carlo exercise, as 
well as setting each  g i, start =0 and varying  α start between −1 and 2 in increments of 0.01. The latter approach (vary-
ing  α start with each  g i, start =0 ) generally resulted in the largest  log-likelihood. 
56 See Gurmu, Rilstone, and Stern (1999, p. 141). 
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A.3 Sample Test Questions
13. A piece of cheese is located at (12, 10) in a coordinate plane. A mouse is at (4,−2) and is running up the 
line y = −5x + 18. At the point (a, b) the mouse starts getting farther from the cheese rather than closer to 
it. What is a + b?
(A) 6 (B) 10 (C) 14 (D) 18 (E) 22
14. Let a, b, c, d, and e be distinct integers such that
(6 − a)(6 − b)(6 − c)(6 − d)(6 − e) = 45. 
What is a + b + c + d + e?
(A) 5 (B)17 (C) 25 (D) 27 (E) 30
15. The set {3, 6, 9, 10} is augmented by a fifth element n, not equal to any of the other four. The median of 
the resulting set is equal to its mean. What is the sum of all possible values of n?
(A) 7 (B) 9 (C) 19 (D) 24 (E) 26
16. How many three-digit numbers are composed of three distinct digits such that one digit is the average of 
the other two?
(A) 96 (B) 104 (C) 112 (D) 120 (E) 256
17. Suppose that sin a + sin b =  √ ___ 5/3 and cos a + cos b = 1. What is cos(a − b)?
(A)  √ __ 5 __3 − 1 (B)  1 __3 (C)  1 __2 (D)  2 __3 (E) 1
18. The polynomial f (x) = x4 + ax3 + bx2 + cx + d has real coefficients, and f (2i) = f (2 + i) = 0. 
What is a + b + c + d?
(A) 0 (B) 1 (C) 4 (D) 9 (E) 16
19. Triangles ABC and ADE have areas 2,007 and 7,002, respectively, with B = (0, 0), C = (223, 0), 
D = (680, 380), and E = (689, 389). What is the sum of all possible x-coordinates of A?
(A) 282 (B) 300 (C) 600 (D) 900  (E) 1,200
20. Corners are sliced off a unit cube so that the six faces each become regular octagons. What is the total 
volume of the removed tetrahedra?
(A)  5  √ 
__ 2 − 7 ________
3
 (B)  10 − 7  √ 
__ 2_________ 
3
 (C)  3 − 2  √ 
__ 2 ________
3
 (D)  8  √ 
__ 2 − 11 _________
3




Figure 3. Questions 13 through 20 from the 2007 AMC 12A
3. Let P(x) = an x n + an−1 xn−1 + ⋯ + a1x + a0 be a polynomial with integer coefficients. Suppose there exist 
distinct integers a, b, c, d such that P(a) = P(b) = P(c) = P(d) = 4. Prove that there exists no integer m 
such that P(m) = 7.
4. The lengths of two sides of an equilateral triangle are doubled, 
creating an isosceles triangle, as shown in the diagram at the right. 
These two longer sides are doubled again creating a third isosceles 
triangle (all three triangles having the same base). This process is 
continued indefinitely. If the measure of the vertex angle of each 
triangle is represented by A1, A2, A3, …, determine, with proof, the 
value of (1 − cos A1) + (1 − cos A2) + (1 − cos A3) + ⋯ .
Figure 4. Questions 3 and 4 from the 2007 Kennesaw (GA) State University HS Mathematics Competition
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